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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Existing Deficiencies in Present Collection
of Intelligence Information

As you will recall, the Joint Intelligence Committee was requested to bring to your attention critical deficiencies existing in the present collection of intelligence information. The Committee has, with this understanding, prepared a list of deficiencies as indicated in the Appendix. This list is limited to the most critical items of intelligence required by the Services. It does not include therefore all of the items of intelligence which the Services are highly desirous of obtaining. If these deficiencies were met, the number of areas in which intelligence information is unsatisfactory would be reduced considerably.

The deficiencies listed fall within the agreed order of priority for the collection of information and production of intelligence to meet the National Intelligence Objectives, as established by Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/2 (Revised), dated 12 June 1952. These priorities were established so that the highest priority would be given to the collection of information and to the production of intelligence concerning Soviet and Satellite (including Communist China) capabilities and intentions for:

- "1. Taking direct military action against the Continental United States.
- "2. Taking direct military action, employing USSR and Satellite Armed Forces, against vital U. S. possessions, areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit, and Western Europe.
- "3. Interfering with U. S. strategic air attack.
- "4. Interfering with U. S. movement of men and material by water transport.
- "5. Production and stockpiling, including location of installations and facilities, of atomic and related weapons, other critical weapons and equipment, and critical transportation equipment.

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DIA review(s)
completed.

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"6. Creating situations anywhere in the world dangerous to U. S. national security, short of commitment of Soviet and Satellite Armed Forces, including foreign directed sabotage and espionage objectives.

"7. Interfering with U. S. political, psychological and economic courses of action for the achievement of critical U. S. aims and objectives."

The intelligence deficiencies listed in the Appendix are separated into two categories: first, those deficiencies which concern all Services; and secondly, those deficiencies about which each Service has expressed particular concern. It will be noted that individual items listed in the second category under a Service heading may be of interest to more than one Service.

There are a number of overt and covert means for collecting intelligence on the Soviet Orbit, all of which are being exploited with varying degrees of success, although the net product of all these types of activity falls short of fulfilling the most critical intelligence needs of the Services. The security measures in force within all Iron Curtain countries, and particularly in the Soviet Union itself, and the distances involved in the Eurasian land mass, make intelligence operations in such areas particularly difficult.

Except for occupied areas or areas wherein U. S. forces are stationed, the Services collect intelligence on any area by Service attaches. One or more of the Services have attaches stationed in the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Hungary. There are no Service attaches in Communist China, Bulgaria and Albania. Even in those Iron Curtain countries where attaches are stationed, their movements are so curtailed by police surveillance that their capability to collect intelligence is severely hampered; nevertheless, they are one of the most reliable and important sources of intelligence on the areas to which they are assigned.

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Considerable work is devoted, by both government agencies and private organizations, to the translation and study of Soviet Orbit periodicals and publications including Communist China. These studies provide much valuable information especially in the industrial and scientific fields.

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The majority

25X1 of the information obtained from this project, though valuable, has been primarily of a basic and static nature on industry, the economy, and construction within the Soviet Orbit.

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Our limited patrol and reconnaissance activities contribute valuable information on Soviet military installations, the location and movements of Soviet naval units and air units, as well as on the location, nature and transmission characteristics of military electronic equipment.

When an intelligence requirement is established by one of the Services, it is first determined whether it is possible to satisfy the requirement by Service collection capabilities. If it appears that CIA's clandestine operations provide the only possibility of obtaining the needed intelligence, a requirement is served on the CIA. If no capability exists, the requirements must be held in abeyance by CIA without action, until a capability is developed. Most requirements concerning the USSR are now in this category. The Services and CIA are in agreement on the existing collection priorities in accordance with present capabilities.

In order to insure the most effective utilization of the espionage resources of CIA, an Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC) was established under the Intelligence Advisory Committee in July, 1951. This Committee maintains a priority listing of all those clandestine collection targets deemed to have a critical status in terms of the over-all interests of the U. S. Government. Through the mechanism of this Committee, the Services make known to CIA all their requirements for which no Service means of collection are available. By periodic briefings, the Service members of the IPC are kept informed of CIA's capabilities for clandestine collection. The requirements including critical deficiencies of the Services are regularly coordinated and reviewed by this Committee in the light of changing needs and the capabilities of CIA.

FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE;

SIGNED
R. C. PARTRIDGE
Major General, GS
Chairman, Joint Intelligence
Committee

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